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1.  Introduction 
 
The main theory for understanding household inter-temporal optimization is the life-
cycle model (LCM) model, which has been used extensively to analyze savings and consumption 
behavior.  The LCM can be extended to find the optimal retirement age, and can be used to make 
predictions about the desire to annuitize or the desire to delay claiming Social Security benefits.  
For example, according to the LCM, individuals who expect to be exceptionally long-lived will 
retire at a later age than individuals who expect to die early because they will need greater 
wealth to finance more years of retirement.  According to almost any model of intertemporal 
maximization, those who expect to be long-lived will view the increase in Social Security 
benefits that results from claiming benefits at 65 rather than at 62 as being financially 
advantageous and will, therefore, delay application for benefits until the age of 65.  In principle 
the decision to retire and the decision to take early, reduced benefits are related decisions, but 
not necessarily the same decision.  This study investigates both decisions by examining the 
relationship between mortality risk and retirement, and mortality risk and the propensity to take 
early, reduced Social Security benefits.   
Although the relationship between mortality risk and retirement has important scientific 
and public policy implications, it has been difficult to study that relationship:  an empirical 
investigation needs to control for economic variables such as wealth, which influences 
retirement but is correlated with mortality, and for health status which makes work more onerous 
and is highly correlated with mortality.   Data on subjective survival provide an opportunity to 
investigate whether mortality risk has effects that are independent from economic effects as 
would be predicted by the LCM, and from health effects.  Should mortality risk have such 
effects, the LCM can be used with greater confidence to integrate studies of asset accumulation 
and the choice of work effort including retirement.  Furthermore, the results would be useful 
additions to models that forecast labor force participation by older workers. Although such 
models may recognize that greater life expectancy requires that more resources be devoted to the 
retirement years, they have not incorporated any behavioral retirement response to the increase 
in life expectancy.   
Moreover, we can learn a good deal about the role of unobserved tastes and perceptions 
by studying claiming behavior.  The claiming of Social Security benefits is similar to the 
decision to purchase annuities.  Because we understand completely Social Security rules and  
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know the population to which these rules apply, Social Security claiming behavior provides 
important information and insights about the desire to annuitize.  In contrast, we have limited 
information about who is eligible to annuitize a defined contribution plan, about the private 
market for annuities where pricing varies from firm to firm, and about the characteristics of the 
population that purchases annuities. 
 Understanding the relationship between retirement and survival is also important for 
public policy.  First, we would like to know how well prepared for extended years of retirement 
are those individuals with above average life expectancy.  Second, the financial liability of the 
Social Security system depends on the level and distribution of life expectancies of beneficiaries 
and on their choices in response to variation in life expectancy.  For example, the reduction in 
Social Security benefits for retirement before age 65 is meant to be actuarially fair.  Yet, 
different individuals when grouped by observable characteristics such as sex and marital status 
have differing life expectancies, and even holding constant observable characteristics, 
individuals have differing subjective survival probabilities.  Those who expect to survive until 
extreme old age may not retire at age 62, and as a consequence they will receive higher benefits 
for many years.  If subjective survival does influence retirement behavior and does predict actual 
mortality, the total Social Security payments to a cohort over its lifetime will be greater than the 
payments predicted from a single life table. 
 
2.  Background 
The LCM makes a number of predictions about the claiming of Social Security benefits 
before the age of 65.  As pointed out by Coile, Diamond, Gruber and Jousten (1999), claiming of 
Social Security benefits after retirement is the same kind of decision as that involved in the 
purchase of annuities.  Someone who retires at age 62 has the option of taking Social Security 
immediately or delaying claiming.  If someone delays claiming for a year, financing 
consumption out of bequeathable wealth, his or her Social Security benefit will be increased by 
approximately eight percent.  Thus, the delay involves the implicit marginal purchase of eight 
percent more in Social Security annuities by the expenditure of a year’s Social Security benefits. 
The aim of the eight percent increase in benefit was to make the implicit purchase actuarially 
fair, and, as the calculations in Coile et al. show, that is approximately the case for a single male 
based on population life tables and a real interest rate of three percent. 
Whether Social Security is approximately fair, however, is not the determinant of  
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whether someone should purchase additional Social Security benefits by delaying claiming: 
rather, according to economic theory, the decision should be based on whether expected lifetime 
utility is increased by the delay.   A simple life-cycle model makes these predictions about the 
desire to annuitize or equivalently the desire to delay claiming.  First, an increase in subjective 
survival should lead to a delay.  Second, an increase in bequeathable wealth should lead to a 
delay because high wealth individuals are not liquidity constrained, and, furthermore, they are 
unlikely to experience a liquidity constraint in the future, which makes Social Security benefits 
more valuable.  Third, an increase in the rate of return on alternative investments should lead to 
early claiming in that part of the cost of a delay is the foregone investment income.  Finally, high 
levels of baseline annuitization such as high levels of pensions should lead to early claiming 
because of the substitution between various forms of annuities.  Extended discussion of these 
effects can be found in Hurd (2000).  All four implications are tested in this paper. 
Based on a life-cycle model Coile et al. report that for representative single men, there is 
an expected utility gain from delaying claiming, and that the gain varies with bequeathable 
wealth.   Using data from the 1982 New Beneficiary Survey, however, they report that very few 
individuals delay claiming.  Among those who retired before the age of 62, 81% claim within the 
first month of reaching age 62, and 91% within the first year.  Only three percent delay claiming 
Social Security benefits until the age at which the implicit price is no longer actuarially fair; age 
65.  These authors conclude that “...part of the population simply claims immediately without 
sufficient consideration of intertemporal choice issues.”   Whether early claiming is due to 
maximization errors by such a large fraction of the population or to observable characteristics, 
subjective beliefs and unobservable tastes is, in our view, an open question; but it is certainly 
important for public policy to establish whether substantial utility gains could be achieved by 
educating the population to make better choices. 
This paper uses data from the first four survey waves of the Health and Retirement Study 
(HRS).  The HRS offers an advance over the New Beneficiary Survey used by Coile et al.  It is a 
panel data set so that we can observe retirement as it happens rather than in retrospection; the 
HRS has detailed information on pensions, which are important determinants of retirement and 
possibly claiming behavior; and, most importantly, it has data on the subjective survival of each 
respondent.  Estimating the effect of life expectancy on retirement or on Social Security claiming 
behavior is complicated by the correlation between economic status and mortality.  It is well 
known those with more wealth or income tend to live longer. But because income and wealth  
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should have independent effects on retirement, it has been very difficult to separate their direct 
economic effects from their correlations with mortality risk.  In the HRS we have variation in 
subjective survival that is independent of age, economic status and health status.  
We estimate the probability of retirement as a function of subjective survival 
probabilities, eligibility for pensions, age, wealth and wage rates as well as a number of other 
individual characteristics that are known to predict retirement such as health status.   This allows 
us to assess whether the subjective survival probabilities have explanatory power for retirement 
after we have controlled for indicators of socio-economic status and health. 
We relate the tendency to take early Social Security benefits to the subjective survival 
probabilities.  Do those with reduced subjective life expectancy see the increase in benefits from 
delaying retirement past age 62 as too small, inducing them to take benefits early?  We analyze 
the Social Security claiming decisions of two groups of individuals:  those who retire before age 
62 and those who retire at age 62 or later.  For the first group, we estimate the determinants of 
the probability of claiming early, reduced Social Security benefits using a reduced form probit 
model, and then, using a censored regression specification, the number of months benefits are 
delayed.  For individuals who retire at the age of 62 or older, we estimate jointly the probability 
of retirement and the probability of claiming using a bivariate probit model.  We divide the 
estimation in this way because people who retire before 62 (and have no intention of returning to 
the labor force) will make a claiming decision that should not be influenced by the determinants 
of retirement (unless those determinants have an independent effect on claiming).  Once a 
worker reaches 62 it is likely that the retirement and claiming decisions will be made jointly 
rather than sequentially. 
 
3.  Data 
 
The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) is a biennial panel with emphasis on retirement 
behavior and how it is affected by health status, economic status and work incentives.  At 
baseline in 1992 the HRS had 12,652 respondents and was nationally representative of 
individuals born in 1931-1941 and their spouses except for over-samples of blacks, Hispanics 
and Floridians (Juster and Suzman, 1995).  This paper uses data from survey waves one through 
four fielded in 1992, 1994, 1996 and 1998.  We also use restricted data on Social Security 
quarters of covered earnings matched with HRS respondent records from the main survey to  
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determine whether a HRS respondent is eligible to receive Social Security benefits.
1 
In the HRS, respondents were asked to give their chances of surviving to target ages of 
75 and 85.  These data have been the objects of considerable work, which has aimed to establish 
that in cross-section the responses are reasonable and in panel that they predict actual mortality.  
Both aims have been established: In the HRS the subjective survival probabilities vary 
appropriately with known risk factors.  For example smokers give lower probabilities and those 
with higher SES give higher probabilities (Hurd and McGarry, 1995).  In cross-section the 
subjective survival probabilities aggregate well to life table levels as shown in Table 1.  For 
example, a weighted average of all age-eligible responses to the target of 75 was 0.645 and a life 
table survival was 0.677.  Thus if individuals survive with the probabilities that they state the 
average survival in the population will be very close to what the life table predicts.   
In panel the subjective probabilities predict actual mortality.  Table 2 shows that between 
waves 1 and 2 183 HRS respondents died and they had given an average subjective survival 
probability to age 75 in wave 1 of 0.45.  Among the survivors the average survival probability 
was 0.65.  The predictive power of the subjective survival probability remains after controlling 
for a number of other risk factors (Hurd and McGarry, forthcoming).  Figure 1 plots actual 
mortality between HRS wave 1 and 2 as a function of the subjective probability of living to age 
85 (P85).  Actual mortality decreases as the subject survival increases.  In particular, mortality is 
much higher for respondents who report P85=0 than for respondent who report higher 
probabilities of living to age 85 and decreases with subjective survival.   
The correlation between P75 and P85 is too great to obtain separate estimates of the 
effect of each on retirement or claiming.  Because P85 has greater dispersion and fewer focal 
point responses than P75, we will use survival to age 85 as our measure of subjective survival.  
 
Retirement 
We use data on the age-eligible (cohorts of 1931-1941) for a total of 35,225 observations 
with up to three observations per person.  Our analyses of retirement are retirement hazards:  
conditional on labor force participation at survey wave 1, 2, or 3 (time t), what is the probability 
of not being the labor force in the following wave (time t+1)?  To be included in the sample, 
                                                 
1 See Olson (1999) and Haider and Solon (2000) for details on the sample of respondents with matched Social 
Security records.  See Zissimopoulos, Panis, Hurd (2002) for a description of OASI beneficiaries in the HRS, their 
eligibility status and characteristics of workers who take early and reduced benefits by age 63.    
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individuals must have reported about their labor force status in sequential waves.  We define 
individuals to be in the labor force as those respondents who report working full-time or part-
time or are unemployed.  Respondents who are not in the labor force in the following wave are 
those who are retired, partially retired, disabled or not in the labor force.
2  This selection reduces 
the sample to 14969.  Although the response rate to the primary variables of interest, the 
probability of living to age 85 is high, individuals 66 years old and older were not queried.  Our 
final sample is based on 11,429 observations.    
 
Social Security Claiming 
  Workers who are insured for Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) may claim 
benefits at the Early Entitlement Age of 62 years.
3  Benefits are permanently reduced if claimed 
before the Normal Retirement Age, which was 65 years over the period of our data.
4  For a 
worker the reduction was 6 2/3% per year so that if taken at age 62 benefits were reduced by 
20%.  Stated differently, if a worker delays claiming from age 62 to 63, benefits will increase by 
8.3%.  A widow(er) may claim benefits at age 60, and a spouse of an insured worker, at age 62.    
   We divide our analysis of claiming into two parts:  individuals who retire before 62 and 
individuals who retire after age 62.  We select individuals who are at least 62 years old in wave 
2, 3, or 4 (7178 observations).  We exclude individuals who claim Disability Insurance, are 
widows, are ineligible for OASI benefits based on quarters of coverage, and any remaining 
individuals who received benefits before age 62.  The first sample is based on those who are not 
in the labor force at 62 years of age.  We use one observation per individual and after the 
selections described above, our sample is 961 individuals.  The second sample is based on 
individuals who are working at age 62.  We use one observation per individual:  the first survey 
wave after turning 62 in which the worker leaves the labor force, or the last wave we observe 
them in if they are still working in wave 4.   Our second sample is based 1046 individuals who 
                                                 
2 The labor force status variables are based on several questions in the HRS including job status, whether the 
respondent is working for pay, considers himself retired, is looking for work, the number of hours working per week 
and per year, and information on any second jobs.  
3 Individuals are insured if they have at least as many credits as the number of full calendar years elapsing after age 
21 and before age 62, disability or death, whichever occurs first.  In our analysis sample, this implies a worker needs 
40 credits to qualify for benefits.   In order to receive benefits, workers must have filed an application for retirement 
benefits and must be age 62 throughout the entire month in which benefits are first paid.  Thus, even if an individual 
applies for benefits prior to his or her 62
nd birthday, he or she will not receive benefits in that first month unless he or 
she was born on either the first or second day of that month (Olson, 1999). 
4 The Normal Retirement Age for workers who become eligible for early benefits in 2000 is 65 years and two 
months and is scheduled to gradually increase to age 67.   
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retire at or after age 62.    
 
4.   Results 
 
4.1.  Retirement 
 
We refer to departure from the labor force as “retirement” even though some retirees may 
re-enter the labor force. The sample is selected to be those working at wave t, where t may be 
one of HRS waves 1, 2 or 3, and our outcome is whether that person has left the labor force 
when we observe him or her at wave t+1, where t+1 is one of waves 2, 3 or 4.   
Table 3 shows the retirement rate as a function of age.  We classify age of the respondent 
as age at t+1 because we want to relate the age at which we observe the labor force outcome to 
the availability of pension income or Social Security benefits.  The retirement rates follow well-
know patterns: retirement spikes at age 62 and again, though to a smaller degree, at age 65.  
There is a large, 16 percentage point increase in the rate at age 62.  Note that with our age 
classification that increase is also found at 63 because a 63 year-old individual would have last 
been observed at age 61 and will have passed through the age of 62 between the waves.  Thus 
any effect of Social Security is spread over the ages of 62 and 63.  The retirement rate increases 
by 13 percentage points at age 65. This increase in retirement rates at age 65 is most likely due to 
the delayed retirement credit and the availability of Medicare.   
We next show that subjective survival, measured by the subjective survival probability to 
age 85 (scaled by 100), predicts retirement.  Table 4 shows the relationship between P85 and 
retirement.  We have aggregated P85 into five categories: zero, 1-49, 50, 51-99 and 100 in order 
to study nonlinear effects.  The table shows that among those age 53-56 the retirement rate 
varied in a statistically significant way between those with a zero probability and those with a 
positive probability.  Sixteen percent of respondents with zero probability of living to age 85 
retired between waves compared to between 10 and 12 percent of respondents who reported a 
positive probability of living to age 85.  Among those 57-61 the results are similar.  At age 62 or 
over the rate of retirement for those with P85 equal to zero is 0.52 and decreases until P85 equals 
50 and then remains flat.  Elevated retirement is confined to those with survival probabilities of 
zero.   
We estimate probit retirement models separately over those aged 53-61 at wave t+1 and  
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over those aged 62 or older because of the likely differing effect of pension eligibility and Social 
Security.  We allow for non-linearities and interactions between financial wealth at wave t+1 and 
expected present discounted value of Social Security wealth and pension wealth at age 62.  We 
define three wealth categories for both types of wealth and their interactions.  The categories are 
low (lowest quartile), medium (second and third quartiles) and high (highest quartile).  In prior 
work we have found that pensions, particularly Defined Benefit (DB) pensions, act to reduce 
retirement when a worker is not yet eligible for benefits and act to accelerate retirement when 
workers become eligible.  Thus we define variables to indicate that a worker has a DB plan, that 
a worker is already eligible for benefits at wave t, that a worker becomes eligible between waves 
t and t+1, or that worker is not yet eligible at wave t+1.  These variables are further defined over 
full or reduced benefits.  In a similar way we define indicator variables for Defined Contribution 
(DC) plans.  We measure health at wave t+1 in two ways: whether a worker has a health 
condition that limits the type or amount of work that he or she can do; and a self-reported five-
point scale from excellent to poor.  Based on prior research we redefine the five-point scale to be 
a three-point scale by combining excellent and very good, and fair and poor.   
Table 5 has the estimated effects on retirement as derived from probit estimation.
5  
Among respondents under age 62, a subjective survival probability of zero results in retirement 
probabilities that are no different than when the subjective survival probability is 50. Reference 
to Table 4 shows that in simple cross-tabulations the difference is about 0.06, so that the 
covariates in the probit have eliminated the raw difference.  Even though the estimated 
coefficients on the P85 variables are individually not significant, as a group the P85 categorical 
variables are significant (p-value = 0.004, not shown).  The overall effects of P85 are not large 
and the pattern is not monotonic.   
Among respondents age 62 and older, the effects of P85 are consistent with the simple 
cross tabulation results:  the effect of P85=0 is to increase retirement by 11 percentage points 
above those with P85=50.  This is an increase in relative risk of retirement of 29 percent.  
Although not significant, the coefficient on P85 = (1-49) indicates elevated retirement 
probabilities by 3 percentage points. 
For clarity the wealth interactions are in Table 6.  High Social Security and pension 
wealth are associated with higher retirement rates, especially at high financial wealth levels.  
                                                 
5The average values of the right-hand variables are shown in Appendix Table 1.  
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Among the younger group, the difference in retirement rates between low and high Social 
Security and pension wealth is 0.063 for low financial wealth and 0.051 for high financial wealth 
levels, which is an increase in relative risk of 48 percent and 39 percent respectively.  Holding 
combined Social security and pension wealth constant at the low (high) quartile, the difference in 
retirement rates between low and high financial wealth is 0.055 (0.043).  Among the older group 
wealth is most strongly associated with retirement when comparing those with low and high 
Social Security and pension wealth holding financial wealth constant.  Among those with high 
financial wealth, the relative risk of retirement increase 39 percent for those with high compared 
to those with low Social Security and pension wealth. There is a similar 33 percent increase 
holding financial wealth constant at the low quartile level.   
In Table 5, DB pension availability has large effects on retirement.  When a worker has a 
DB plan but is not yet eligible to receive benefits, the retirement hazard is reduced by 0.066 
relative to a worker who does not have a DB plan.  However, if the worker was already eligible 
for full benefits, the retirement hazard increases by 0.147.  The retirement rate of such a worker 
would be 0.081 (0.147-0.066) higher than a worker lacking a DB plan.
6  These are large effects 
relative to an average retirement rate of 0.132.  Among workers who become eligible between 
the waves, retirement increases by 0.159. Eligibility for reduced benefits has similar but smaller 
effects.  In the older age group the pattern of effects of pension eligibility is about the same as 
that for the younger age group.  Although the absolute magnitudes are large, in terms of relative 
risk, the magnitudes are similar.  Eligibility for DC pensions increases the retirement rate but by 
much less than DB pensions.  This is to be expected because DC plans typically lack the strong 
incentives of many DB plans.  
The health indicators, particularly among the younger age group, have large effects.  For 
example the relative risk of retirement is increased by 141 percent when a worker has a health 
condition that limits work.  For the older group, the effects are also large:  the relative risk of 
retirement increases by 77 percent when a worker has a health condition that limits work.  Self-
assessed health as fair or poor increases retirement among the younger age group by 0.060 
relative to individuals with good health but has relatively little effect in the older age group.  It 
may be that the financial incentives are such that workers of all health status leave the labor 
force at these older ages leaving just a small role for health.   
                                                 
6The categorical variables on full and reduced DB benefits are mutually exclusive, so that the effect on a  
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Our overall conclusion about the effects of the subjective survival probability on 
retirement is that before the age of 62, they have no systematic effect.  Beginning at age 62 
workers with a very low survival probability do leave the labor force earlier than those with 
moderate or high survival probabilities, and the effect accumulates over a number of years to 
produce substantial effects.  To illustrate the cumulative effects, Table 7 shows some simulated 
labor force participation rates based on the probit estimates.  The simulations are for a group of 
workers aged 52.  Those with P85=50 are simulated out based on the average population 
retirement hazards.   Those with other values of P85 are simulated out based on altered 
retirement hazards according to the estimated probit effects.  The results for those aged 53-61 are 
used to age 62 and the results for those aged 62 or over are used for older ages.   
About 54.6 percent of workers who have an unchanging subjective survival probability 
of 50 would remain in the labor force to age 62 whereas just 43.4 percent of workers reporting 
P85=0 would remain at age 62.  About 18.6 percent of workers who have an unchanging 
subjective survival probability of 50 would remain in the labor force to age 67.  This 
participation rate is about the same for other levels of P85 with the exception of those with 
P85=0.  Among that group the rate would be 0.074.  Of course the correlation between 
retirement and actual survival would be greater than what we have discussed because of the 
correlations between our health indicators and survival.  Thus workers with a health condition 
that limits work have reduced survival chances and leave the labor force at elevated rates. 
 
4.2.  Claiming of Social Security benefits 
 
In this section, we divide our analysis sample into two parts:  individuals who retire 
before 62 and individuals who retire after age 62.  We select individuals who are at least 62 
years old in wave 2, 3, or 4 and exclude individuals who claim Disability Insurance, are widows, 
are ineligible for OASI benefits based on quarters of coverage, and any remaining individuals 
who start receiving benefits before age 62.  We divide the sample into two parts:  workers who 
are not in the labor force at age 62 years of age and workers who are working at age 62.   
 
                                                                                                                                                             
worker who is eligible for both full and reduced benefits is found from the coefficient on full benefits only.  
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Social Security claiming by workers who retire before age 62 
 
Table 8 shows the rate of Social Security claiming after 62 among workers who retire before age 
62 and who claim by wave 4.  Eighty one percent of retirees claim Social Security benefits 
within two months they turn 62.  Although a large fraction of retiree claim immediately, long 
claiming delays are empirically important for a small fraction of retirees.   By age 63, 10 percent 
of retirees have not claimed.   
Table 9 shows the rate of Social Security claiming for two education classes:  high school 
graduates or less compared with individuals who complete college or some college.  Among the 
more educated, claiming rates are higher if P85 is in the range of 0 to 50 than if it is 51-100.  No 
pattern emerges among those with less education. 
We estimated the determinants of early claiming over the sample that has retired by 62.  
We define early claiming by this group to be claiming by age 62 and 2 months.  Table 10 has the 
estimated effects on early Social Security claiming from two statistical specifications.  The first, 
in the left-hand columns, are the marginal effects from a probit model of the probability of 
claiming within two months after turning 62.  The second, in the right-hand columns, come from 
a censored regression model for the number of months that claiming is delayed.  The bunching at 
zero months, no delay, is assumed to be left censored and observations for respondent who have 
not yet claimed by wave 4 are right censored.  We allow for non-linearities and interactions 
between financial wealth (less housing and business wealth) and Social Security wealth by 
defining three income and three wealth categories and their interactions.  We include income 
from pensions separately as an indicator for having pension income and the amount of pension 
income.  We expect high levels of annuitization to increase early claiming because under the 
LCM the value of an annuity decreases with the level of annuities (Hurd, 2000).  High levels of 
wealth should decrease early claiming by reducing liquidity constraints and because the value of 
an annuity increases with the level of bequeathable wealth.  The value of an annuity declines 
with the rate of return on alternative investments, so we include an indicator for whether the 
individual owns stock:  stockowners may think of additional stock owning as the marginal 
investment.   
Seventy-two percent claim within two months of reaching age 62, and according the 
results in Table 10, we can find little that differentiates between the early claimers and the later 
claimers.  For example, in the probit just two explanatory variables out of 18 are significant at  
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the five percent level (excluding the constant and a categorical variable for missing values). 
Considering both specifications together, we see no systematic pattern of claiming as a 
function of P85.  The only significant coefficient is from the probit specification, but even there 
the important difference is with respect to P85=0.50, not with respect to the other categories.
7 
The LCM predicts that a combination of high bequeathable wealth and low Social 
Security wealth will lead to delayed claiming and that low bequeathable wealth and high Social 
Security wealth will lead to accelerated claiming.   These predictions are not based on a total 
wealth effect on claiming, but rather on the valuation that individuals place on annuities as a 
function of the mix between annuity wealth and bequeathable wealth.  The LCM makes no 
predictions about the combination of low bequeathable and low Social Security wealth or about 
the combination of high bequeathable and high Social Security wealth.  We do see a suggestion 
of an interaction effect in the probit and a significant effect in the tobit for the low-low 
combination, but this would not be predicted by the LCM.  Stockowners have a greater 
probability of claiming, which is consistent with the view that their alternative investment return 
is higher than those who do not own stocks. 
  Having had some college leads to about a 1.5 month delay in claiming.  This result 
suggests that the better education have better understanding of the benefits of delaying, but the 
magnitude of the effect is rather small.  Married workers have a greater financial benefit to delay 
claiming Social Security benefits than single workers:  the surviving spouse can inherit the 
benefit of the retired worker effectively increasing the life expectance of the couple.
8  We find 
that married workers do delay claiming:  the probability of early claiming is reduced by 0.088 or 
1.1 month.   
 
Social Security claiming by workers who retire at age 62 or older 
 
In this section we analyze the joint decision to retire and claim among those still working 
at age 62.  Thirty percent of this sample retires by age 63 and 41 percent claim benefits.  
Conditional on retiring, 81 percent claim Social Security benefits by age 63.  Table 11 has the 
                                                 
7 The cross-tabulations in Table showed college educated individuals with subjective survival of zero had higher 
rates of early claiming but that was not the case for individuals with high school degrees or less.  We interacted P85 
with an indicator for college education in the probit estimation,  but found that none of the interactions was 
statistically different from zero (results not shown). 
8 These benefits are shown in simulation in Coile et al. (1999).  
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estimated determinants of retiring by age 63 and of claiming early, reduced Social Security 
benefits by age 63 from a bivariate probit estimation.  As before, we allow for non-linearities and 
interactions between financial wealth and Social Security wealth by defining three income and 
three wealth categories and their interactions.  We include whether a respondent has a pension 
plan, the present, discounted value of pension wealth at age 62, indicators of pension eligibility, 
an indicator for whether the individual owns stock, and general demographic information.   
Subjective survival of 0 is significantly associated with higher levels of both retiring and 
of claiming Social Security benefits, but no pattern is evident in the effects of other levels of 
P85. None of the wealth and Social Security and pension wealth variables have a significant 
relationship with claiming, and no pattern is evident.  A combination of low financial wealth and 
high Social Security and pension wealth delays retirement significantly, but overall there is no 
pattern to the effect of these variables on retirement.  Having some college education delays 
retirement, possibly because the more educated have more favorable working conditions.  Highly 
educated individuals delay claiming benefits.  As shown in Table 10 we found a similar effect 
among those who retired before age 62.  A notable difference is that married respondents 
claimed earlier in Table 11 whereas they claimed later in Table 10.  The estimated correlation 
coefficient between retiring and claiming (ρ ) is 0.709, showing that highly coordinated retiring 
and claiming remains after controlling for observables. 
We use the estimates in Table 11 to predict rates of retirement and claiming of 
respondents as a function of subjective survival.  It is apparent that the only substantial 
difference in claiming behavior is when P85 is 0.  Conditional on retirement, the rate of claiming 
is about 83% whereas it is about 75% for other values of P85 (Table 12).  Conditional on not 
retiring, claiming is about 35% when P85 is 0 and about 25% for other values of P85. 
 
5.   Simulated Social Security claiming rates 
Subjective survival affects claiming through its effect on retirement as well as through its 
direct effects.  We combine the effects of the subjective survival probabilities on retirement with 
their effects on claiming by conducting a simulation exercise.  To do this we consider a 
population of workers at age 52 as in the simulation reported in Table 7.  We simulate out their 
retirement rates to age 62, and then simulate the claiming rates based on the claiming probits as 
reported in Table 10 and Table 11.  The results of these simulations are in Table 13.  Just as in 
Table 7 the participation rates at age 62 are 0.434, 0.518, 0.546, 0.533 and 0.524, with the  
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implied retirement rates of 0.566, 0.482, 0.454, 0.467, and 0.476.  Conditional on these 
retirement rates the early claiming rates for workers who retire before age 62 are 0.719 for those 
with a subjective survival rate of 50 (the population claiming rate), 0.650 for those with a 
subjective survival probability of 0, 0.670 for P85=(49-99), 0.617 for P85=(51-99) and 0.636 for 
those with a subjective survival probability of 100.  Twenty-four percent of workers who retire at 
age 62 or older also claim by the first 2 months after turning 62.  Using the predictions from 
Table 12, we calculate claiming rates and adjust the overall claiming rate to reflect the claiming 
of this group.   
The overall effects are shown in the last column of the table.  Thus we predict that in a 
population of 52 year-old workers who have a subjective survival probability of zero about 52 
percent will be in receipt of Social Security benefits within a few month of turning 62; among 
those with a subjective survival probability of 50, about 46 percent will be in receipt of Social 
Security benefits shortly after turning 62 and among those with subjective survival probability of 
100 about 46 percent will be in receipt.  We view this variation in the receipt of Social Security 
benefits to be relatively large, especially in view of the fact that the estimations control for a 
large number of socio-economic variables that are themselves correlated with mortality, and 
which are also predictive of retirement.   
 
6.  Conclusion  
We began this research by proposing to test four predictions of the LCM about the Social 
Security claiming behavior and more generally the desire to purchase annuities.  First, we found 
some support for an effect of perceived mortality risk in that those with very low subjective 
survival who are working at age 62 both retired earlier and claimed earlier than others.  The fact 
that a zero subjective survival has an effect but not other levels is generally consistent with the 
fact that a zero probability is a strong predictor of actual mortality.   Second, high levels of 
financial wealth should lead to a desire to delay claiming, but we found no such effect.  Third, if 
the rate of return on alternative investments is high, claiming should be early so that high-yield 
money does not have to be used to finance consumption.  We found some limited evidence for 
this effect based on stock ownership.  Fourth, high levels of pensions or Social Security should 
lead to early claiming because the marginal utility of further annuities is reduced.  We found not 
support for this hypothesis.  
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These results have implications for the study of annuitization of bequeathable wealth or 
the choice to purchase annuities rather than take a lump sum from a pension.  We know the rules 
about the implicit purchase of Social Security annuities, the eligible population, inflation risk 
associated with the annuity, and the price.  Often in the study of privately purchased annuities at 
least some of this information is missing.  In that we could find almost no explanations for the 
variation in Social Security claiming delay, it will not be easy to explain variation in the 
purchased of annuities or in the annuitization of pensions, where we have less information 
As pointed out by Hurd (2000), the purchase of Social Security annuities through delayed 
claiming has advantages over privately purchased or pension annuities in that the implicit price 
is actuarially fair based on population life tables rather than on selected life tables.  The benefits 
are indexed and payments are not risky.   Therefore, it would seem that a Social Security annuity 
is more attractive than an annuity purchased in the private market.  The very low rate of implicit 
purchase of Social Security annuities would lead to the prediction that the rate of purchase of 
annuities in the private market is low and that there is a tendency to cash out pensions rather than 
annuitizing them. 
In our view the high levels of claiming and the corresponding reluctance to annuitize is a 
major puzzle.  In the HRS population there is very substantial variation in economic 
circumstances and personal characteristics.  It is probable that there is similar variation in 
unobserved characteristics as evidenced by the large variation in behaviors such as saving.  Yet, 
the observed data do not explain much of claiming behavior.  Indeed, there is not much to 
explain because of the high rates of claiming shortly following retirement. 
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* Weighted average of responses of individuals from birth years of 1931 through 1941; estimated standard errors 
in parentheses.  9149 observations in wave 1.   
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Lived to wave 2 
 


















Sample is individuals 46 to 65 in wave 1. 
Source: Hurd and McGarry, forthcoming  
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Table 3.  Retirement rates 
 
 
Age at t+1  Observations  Retirement rate  Standard error 
52 271  0.09  0.02 
53 660  0.08  0.01 
54 905  0.11  0.01 
55 1263  0.13  0.01 
56 1425  0.13  0.01 
57 1655  0.12  0.01 
58 1474  0.12  0.01 
59 1540  0.16  0.01 
60 1362  0.18  0.01 
61 1319  0.21  0.01 
62 1162  0.37  0.01 
63 884  0.41  0.02 
64 493  0.38  0.02 
65 342  0.51  0.03 
66 160  0.46  0.04 
67 54  0.35  0.07  
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Table 4.  Average retirement rates and subjective survival 
 
Survival to 85  Number of observations Rate  Standard error 
Age 53-56       
0 559  0.16  0.02 
1-49 1431  0.10  0.01 
50 841  0.10  0.01 
51-99 905  0.12  0.01 
100 329  0.12  0.02 
All 4065  0.12  0.01 
Age 57-61       
0 857  0.19  0.01 
1-49 2259  0.15  0.01 
50 1347  0.15  0.01 
51-99 1345  0.17  0.01 
100 592  0.16  0.02 
All 6400  0.16  0.00 
Age 62 or older       
0 281  0.52  0.03 
1-49 856  0.40  0.02 
50 476  0.38  0.02 
51-99 548  0.38  0.02 
100 261  0.38  0.03 
All 2422  0.40  0.01 
Note:  based on panel observations from waves 1 to 2, waves 2 to 3 and waves 3 to 4.  
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Table 5.  Probability of leaving the labor force:  effects from probit estimation 
  Age 53-61   Age 62+  
 dF/dx P>|z|  dF/dx P>|z| 
Probability of surviving to age 85  (x100)     
0 -0.005 0.674  0.113 0.004 
1-49 -0.012 0.150  0.027 0.365 
50 -- --  -- -- 
51-99 0.015 0.098  0.019 0.566 
100 0.004 0.731  0.023 0.560 
Missing -0.027 0.020  0.018 0.569 
Financial Wealth     
Quartile low (25%)  -0.018 0.097  0.032 0.351 
Quartile medium (50%)  -- --  -- -- 
Quartile high (25%)  0.041 0.000  0.044 0.180 
Social Security & Pension Wealth     
Quartile low (25%)  -0.026 0.028  -0.065 0.068 
Quartile medium (50%)  -- --  -- -- 
Quartile high (25%)  0.029 0.004  0.054 0.094 
Financial*SS&Pension    
Low and low  0.016 0.349  -0.054 0.320 
Low and high  0.024 0.328  -0.044 0.602 
High and low  0.012 0.544  -0.011 0.861 
High and High  0.008 0.619  0.021 0.670 
Wage rate (x1000)  -0.004 0.868  -0.344 0.545 
Wage rate missing  0.037 0.000  0.018 0.536 
No pension  -- --  -- -- 
Do not know pension  0.000 0.993  0.076 0.410 
DB pension  -0.066 0.000  -0.181 0.003 
Full benefits: not eligible  -- --  -- -- 
already eligible  0.147 0.000  0.302 0.000 
newly eligible  0.159 0.000  0.340 0.000 
Reduced benefits: not eligible  -- --  -- -- 
already eligible  0.076 0.000  0.181 0.014 
newly eligible  0.090 0.000  0.265 0.001 
Eligibility missing  0.040 0.012  0.256 0.000 
DC pension  -0.067 0.000  -0.030 0.447 
not eligible  -- --  -- -- 
already eligible  0.028 0.207  0.071 0.165 
newly eligible  0.061 0.016  -0.070 0.326 
Eligibility missing  0.052 0.002  0.084 0.110 
College -0.019 0.004  -0.089 0.000 
Male -0.039 0.000  -0.083 0.000 
Single -- --  -- -- 
Married -0.017 0.032  0.026 0.312 
Health limits work  0.186 0.000  0.300 0.000 
Health poor or fair  0.060 0.000  0.025 0.387 
Health good  -- --  -- -- 
Health very good or excellent  0.012 0.088  0.011 0.594 
Age 53-56  -- --  -- -- 
Age 57-61  0.029 0.000   
Constant -0.239 0.000  -0.166 0.000 
Number of observations  11429   2958  
Average 0.132   0.392   
  23 
 
Table 6.  Wealth effects on retirement in following wave 
 
 
  Age 53-61 next wave  Age 62+ next wave 
  Social Security and Pension 
Wealth 




low medium  high low medium High 
low -0.028  -0.018  0.035 -0.087 0.032 0.042 
medium  -0.026  --- 0.029 -0.065 --- 0.054 
high 0.027  0.041  0.078 -0.032 0.044 0.119 
Note: results from Table 5.  Low wealth is the lowest quartile; medium is the second or 
third quartiles; high is the top quartile. 
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Table 7.  Simulated labor force participation rates 
 
 Subjective  Survival 
Age 0  1-49 50  51-99  100 
52  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
53  0.969 0.977 0.965 0.950 0.962 
54  0.935 0.943 0.931 0.916 0.928 
55  0.893 0.901 0.889 0.874 0.886 
56  0.844 0.852 0.840 0.825 0.837 
57  0.798 0.806 0.794 0.779 0.791 
58  0.751 0.759 0.747 0.732 0.744 
59  0.713 0.721 0.709 0.694 0.706 
60  0.664 0.672 0.660 0.645 0.657 
61  0.607 0.615 0.603 0.588 0.600 
62  0.434 0.518 0.546 0.533 0.524 
63  0.336 0.420 0.448 0.435 0.426 
64  0.249 0.333 0.361 0.348 0.339 
65  0.184 0.268 0.296 0.283 0.274 
66  0.117 0.201 0.229 0.216 0.207 
67  0.074 0.158 0.186 0.173 0.164 
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Table 8.  Rate of Social Security claiming among retirees 
 
















Note:  Number of observations is 824.  Respondents retired 
before age 62 and claimed by wave 4. 
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Table 9.  Social Security claiming rates by P85 and education level 
 
Survival to 85  Fraction claiming by Age 62 and 2 months 
  High school graduate or less  At least some college 
0 0.678  0.727 
1-49 0.740 0.717 
50 0.752  0.764 
51-99 0.689  0.636 
100 0.712  0.653 
Note:  sample of respondents retired before age 62.   
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Table 10. Determinants of the probability of Social Security claiming:  
probit and tobit estimation 
 
  Probability of Claiming by 
age 62 and 2 months 
Months Delay 
 Effect P>|z| Coefficient  P>|t| 
Subjective survival     
0 -0.065 0.224 1.063  0.359 
1-49 -0.054 0.218 1.157  0.208 
50    
51-99 -0.105 0.026 1.501  0.140 
100 -0.081 0.196 2.079  0.130 
missing -0.536 0.010 6.086  0.149 
Financial Wealth     
Quartile low (25%)  -0.010 0.838 -0.284  0.798 
Quartile medium (50%)     
Quartile high (25%)  0.003 0.961 1.284  0.321 
Social Security Wealth     
Quartile low (25%)  -0.013 0.812 -0.277  0.814 
Quartile medium (50%)     
Quartile high (25%)  0.083 0.126 -1.859  0.096 
Financial*SS wealth      
Low and low  -0.145 0.079 6.454  0.001 
Low and high  -0.049 0.742 1.016  0.750 
High and low  -0.036 0.709 -0.148  0.944 
High and High  -0.020 0.821 0.372  0.841 
Pension wealth (x100k)  0.002 0.841 0.272  0.092 
Has pension wealth  0.020 0.607 -0.763  0.361 
Owns stock  0.073 0.048 -1.401  0.073 
High school graduate or less     
College -0.063 0.063 1.523  0.036 
Male 0.044 0.157 0.065  0.923 
Married -0.088 0.051 1.107  0.249 
Constant 0.287 0.000 2.449  0.092 
Number of observations  907 961   
Average 0.719 4.406   
Note:  sample of workers who retire before age 62.  Financial wealth is less housing and 
business wealth.  Regressions include wave of observation indicators. 
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Table 11.  Probability of retiring and claiming Social Security benefits by age 63:   
bivariate probit estimation 
 
 Retire Claim   
 Coefficient P-value Coefficient  P-value 
Subjective survival     
0 0.384 0.032 0.344  0.047 
1-49 0.000 0.998 -0.004  0.973 
50 --- ---   
51-99 -0.085 0.547 0.065  0.625 
100 0.247 0.161 0.125  0.466 
Missing -0.111 0.845 -0.443  0.437 
Financial Wealth     
Quartile low (25%)  0.090 0.524 0.125  0.346 
Quartile medium (50%)  --- ---   
Quartile high (25%)  -0.103 0.493 -0.057  0.696 
Social Security Wealth     
Quartile low (25%)  * -0.135  0.326 
Quartile medium (50%)  ---   
Quartile high (25%)  * -0.159  0.206 
Financial*SS wealth      
Low and low  * -0.054  0.796 
Low and high  * 0.067  0.822 
High and low  * -0.232  0.368 
High and High  * -0.085  0.678 
Social Security & Pension 
Wealth 
  
Quartile low (25%)  0.100 0.498 *   
Quartile medium (50%)  ---    
Quartile high (25%)  0.218 0.089 *   
Financial*SS & Pension wealth     
Low and low  -0.312 0.153 *   
Low and high  -0.921 0.019 *   
High and low  -0.129 0.644 *   
High and High  0.059 0.777 *   
Wage rate (x1000)  -0.038 0.804 *   
Wage rate missing  0.107 0.340 *   
Pension wealth  * -0.017  0.380 
Has pension wealth  * 0.116  0.176 
Do not know pension  0.281 0.513 *   
DB pension  0.129 0.686 *   
Full Benefits: not eligible  ---    
already eligible  0.416 0.209 *   
newly eligible  0.421 0.215 *   
Reduced benefits: not eligible  ---    
already eligible  0.489 0.180 *   
newly eligible  1.074 0.006 *    
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Eligibility missing  0.088 0.803 *   
DC pension  0.353 0.045 *   
not eligible     
already eligible  -0.078 0.742 *   
newly eligible  0.333 0.273 *   
Eligibility missing  -0.072 0.769 *   
Eligibility not recorded   0.741 0.000 *   
Owns stock  * -0.069  0.460 
High school graduate or less     
College -0.238 0.011 -0.323  0.000 
Male -0.262 0.003 -0.133  0.123 
Married 0.130 0.283 0.263  0.019 
Health limits work  0.222 0.058 *   
Health poor or fair  0.316 0.004 *   
Health good     
Health very good or excellent  0.151 0.086 *   
Constant -0.970 0.000 -0.088  0.615 
Number of observations  1046 1046   
Average 0.296 0.405   
ρ   0.709   
Note:  Sample is workers who retired at age 62 or older.  Regressions includes wave of 
observation indicators. 
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0  0.360 0.075 0.828 0.195 0.370 0.345 
1-49  0.209 0.070 0.749 0.176 0.545 0.244 
50  0.216 0.072 0.750 0.171 0.541 0.240 
51-99  0.195 0.055 0.780 0.202 0.548 0.269 
100  0.292 0.090 0.764 0.171 0.447 0.277 
All  0.227 0.069 0.767 0.182 0.521 0.259 
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Table 13.  Estimated effects of subjective survival on Social Security receipt  





Labor force participation 
at age 52 
Labor force participation 
at age 62 
Rate of Social Security 
receipt 
0 1.000    0.434  0.521 
1-49 1.000  0.518  0.445 
50 1.000    0.546  0.459 
51-99 1.000  0.533  0.419 
100 1.000    0.524  0.455  
  32 
Appendix Table 1.  Average values of right-hand variables: probit estimation of retirement 
 
 
  Age 53-61   Age 62+  
Variable  Mean  Std dev.  Mean Std. dev. 
Subjective survival     
0 0.119 0.324  0.090 0.286 
1-49 0.312 0.463  0.279 0.449 
51-99 0.188 0.391  0.177 0.382 
100 0.076 0.265  0.084 0.277 
missing 0.118 0.323  0.216 0.411 
Financial Wealth     
Quartile low (25%)  0.246 0.431  0.219 0.414 
Quartile high (25%)  0.246 0.431  0.292 0.455 
SS & Pension Wealth     
Quartile low (25%)  0.240 0.427  0.259 0.438 
Quartile high (25%)  0.250 0.433  0.268 0.443 
Financial *SS/Pension     
Low and low  0.109 0.312  0.101 0.302 
Low and high  0.018 0.134  0.016 0.125 
High and low  0.035 0.183  0.052 0.221 
High and high  0.099 0.299  0.119 0.323 
Wage rate  16.1 227.2  17.4 258.0 
Wage rate missing  0.113 0.317  0.133 0.340 
Do not know pension   0.012 0.107  0.010 0.100 
DB pension  0.372 0.483  0.328 0.470 
Full benefits:     
already eligible  0.049 0.216  0.091 0.288 
newly eligible  0.027 0.162  0.075 0.264 
Reduced benefits:     
already eligible  0.056 0.231  0.042 0.201 
newly eligible  0.022 0.148  0.030 0.171 
Eligibility missing  0.049 0.217  0.058 0.234 
DC pension  0.206 0.405  0.213 0.410 
already eligible  0.024 0.154  0.064 0.245 
newly eligible  0.014 0.118  0.025 0.157 
Eligibility missing  0.045 0.206  0.056 0.229 
College 0.418 0.493  0.406 0.491 
Male 0.524 0.499  0.550 0.498 
Married 0.745 0.436  0.735 0.441 
Health limits work  0.129 0.335  0.148 0.356 
Health poor or fair  0.156 0.363  0.177 0.382 
Health very good or excellent  0.540 0.498  0.490 0.500 
Age 57-61  0.619 0.486  -- -- 
Number of observations  11429   2958   
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Appendix Table 2:  Average values of right-hand variables:  Social Security claiming regression 
 
 
Variables Mean  Std.  Dev. 
Subjective survival     
0 0.135  0.342 
1-49 0.360  0.480 
51-99 0.220  0.414 
100 0.080  0.272 
Missing 0.007  0.085 
Financial wealth     
Quartile low (25%)  0.251  0.434 
Quartile high (25%)  0.249  0.432 
Social Security wealth     
Quartile low (25%)  0.251  0.434 
Quartile high (25%)  0.250  0.433 
Financial*SS wealth     
Low and low  0.082  0.275 
Low and high  0.012  0.111 
High and low  0.056  0.230 
High and High  0.100  0.300 
Pension wealth  179,875  264,520 
Has pension wealth  0.587  0.493 
Own stock  0.451  0.498 
College 0.391  0.488 
Male 0.478  0.500 
Married 0.841  0.366 
Wave 1994  0.304  0.460 
Wave 1998  0.330  0.470 
Number of observations  961   
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Appendix Table 3:  Average values of right-hand variables:  Social Security claiming and 
retirement bivariate probit regression 
 
Variables Mean Std.  dev. 
Subjective survival   
0 0.086 0.281 
1-49 0.407 0.492 
51-99 0.253 0.435 
100 0.094 0.292 
Missing 0.007 0.082 
Financial wealth   
Quartile low (25%)  0.249 0.432 
Quartile high (25%)  0.250 0.433 
Social Security wealth   
Quartile low (25%)  0.250 0.433 
Quartile high (25%)  0.250 0.433 
Financial*SS wealth   
Low and low  0.095 0.293 
Low and high  0.023 0.150 
High and low  0.050 0.217 
High and High  0.094 0.292 
Social Security & Pension wealth   
Quartile low (25%)  0.250 0.433 
Quartile high (25%)  0.250 0.433 
Financial*SS & Pension wealth   
Low and low  0.108 0.311 
Low and high  0.016 0.127 
High and low  0.040 0.196 
High and High  0.094 0.292 
Wage rate  26.240 433.920 
Wage rate missing  0.174 0.379 
Pension wealth  116,789 234,135 
Has pension  0.498 0.500 
Do not know pension  0.011 0.107 
DB pension  0.324 0.468 
Full benefits:   
already eligible  0.108 0.311 
newly eligible  0.076 0.266 
Reduced benefits:   
already eligible  0.037 0.190 
newly eligible  0.025 0.156 
Eligibility missing  0.063 0.243 
DC pension  0.188 0.391 
already eligible  0.059 0.236 
newly eligible  0.023 0.150 
Eligibility missing  0.049 0.215 
No pension record  0.098 0.297 
Own stock  0.334 0.472  
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College 0.419 0.494 
Male 0.598 0.490 
Married 0.785 0.411 
Health limits work  0.114 0.318 
Health poor or fair  0.191 0.393 
Health very good or excellent  0.458 0.498 
Wave 1994  0.085 0.279 
Wave 1998  0.658 0.475 
Number of Observations  1046   
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